Richard Lemmens website

Copyright:
Attribution NonCommercial ShareAlike
This text content and maps on this page are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike license license. This means that: adapting the content is allowed; using the content for commercial purposes is not allowed; sharing and redistributing the content with others is allowed. If you do any of the above, you must attribute your copy to its creator, Richard Lemmens, and make sure any alterations and distributions are licensed in the same way as the original. More info about Creative Commons licenses can be found at the Creative Commons website.

Warmatrix

War Matrix - Battle of Freiburg

Age of Reason 1620 CE - 1750 CE, Battles and sieges

The Grand Condé throwing his baton, 19th century CE French educational card
The Grand Condé throwing his baton, 19th century CE French educational card
The Battle of Freiburg, also known as the Three Day Battle, was fought in 1644 CE between France and the army of Bavaria. The French doggedly attacked the stronger Bavarian position, suffered terrible losses, but later snatched victory by bypassing the town. The battle was one of the bloodiest of the war.
In 1644 CE the Thirty Years' War was drawing to an end. The Congress of Westphalia had already started a year earlier, but would take four more years before a peace treaty was signed. In the meanwhile the war was still going on, with France as the main aggressor. Operations elsewhere had freed up German forces under Franz von Mercy to go on to the offensive in the southwest. Turenne, who raced to save the French possessions in the region, had only 5,000 cavalry, 5,000 infantry and 37 guns, too few to prevent von Mercy to take Freiburg. The Germans numbered 8,200 cavalry, 8,600 infantry and 20 guns and were welll dug in.
When Louis the Bourbon, the Grand Condé, arrived with 4,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry, he immediately ordered a counterattack. Freiburg lay at the western end of a deep valley flanked by mountains, hills, forest and a river. Turenne and Rosen proposed outflanking von Mercy to the north through the Glotter valley, but de Bourbon insisted on a frontal attack. His troops attacked in three waves, suffering horrible losses. At the last, he is rumored to have thrown his baton into an enemy redoubt and ordered his men to fetch it. After nightfall the defenders were exhausted, nearly out of ammunition and in danger of being encircled, so von Mercy ordered a withdrawal to the Schlierberg ridge. The Germans lost 1,000 men; the French 2,800.
The following day it rained continuously and little fighting took place. The Germans used the respite to re-order their guns and construct a new redoubt. The approach was so narrow that their position could only be taken by another frontal assault. That was launched the next day, when the weather had cleared. Bad coordination caused attacks on the flanks to be launched prematurely, but timing was of little importance, as the attackers had to fight uphill against strong positions. Again wave after wave broke on the defenses. Close before nightfall, the French had lost another 4,000 men and the Germans 1,100. Both attackers and defenders were exhausted.
Four days later the French had been reinforced by 5,000 men, drawn from every nearby garrison. Finally de Bourbon accepted the advice of his subordinates to choose the route through the Glotter valley. Von Mercy raced north to stop the advance and briefly repulsed the French general Rosen with a cavalry charge, but then had to retreat because he was outnumbered. Turenne persuaded de Bourbon to bypass Freiburg and press deeper into Germany. This they did and eventually the French managed to reach Mainz, rendering von Mercy's tactical victory at Freiburg fruitless.